Euthyphro (Piety) By Plato Audiobook

Euthyphro (Piety) By Plato audiobook with text and illustration, and dramatized 🎵 with sound effects and music, by Audiobooks Dimension.

Title : Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων)
Author : Plato (Πλάτων)
Written : 397 BCE
Place of Origin : Ancient Greece
Original Media type : Papyrus fragments, Manuscript
Original Language : Ancient Greek
Genre(s) : Ancient Greece, Dialogue, Philosophy
Translator : Benjamin Jowett (1817 - 1893)
Narrators : David Rintoul, and Full Cast
Musician : Nature's Eye
Editor : Audiobooks Dimension

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Dramatized 🎵

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Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων) by Plato, is a Socratic dialogue whose events occur in the weeks before the trial of Socrates (399 BCE), between Socrates and Euthyphro. The dialogue covers subjects such as the meaning of piety and justice. As is common with Plato's earliest dialogues, it ends in aporia.

Euthyphro is one of the original dialogues of Plato, written immediately after the death of Socrates; it is similar to many other, equally beautiful dialogues of the great writer of antiquity, which, like the other dialogues, are mainly concerned with the most accurate development possible of the definition of various concepts, fundamental issues of logical science, which had not been developed until then. Because before Socrates no one had yet dealt with the philosophical definitions of things, he was the first to examine what each of the beings is with a special love and delight, surrounding his discourses with such alluring grace that he it touches on even the driest of issues, which are indeed such philosophical discussions. But if listening to those speeches of the eloquent Athenian philosopher evoke so much fascination, imagine now how entertaining it is to read these dialogues, as they were crafted by the magician of the Greek language, the master of the Greek language, Elder Plato, who, in his excellent gifts, with which nature had richly endowed Socrates, added as fine embroideries his all-gold ornaments with the graceful stylus of the ancient Attic discourse, so that no one knows today who he admires more, the quick-witted philosopher or the timid writer, whose "sorely Attic calliphonia and wonderful grandiosity" is so distinguished by Lucian.

Euthyphro was a soothsayer well-known in Athens for his excessive religiosity, originally from Prospalta, a municipality of Attica, which was located approximately where the current village of Keratia, behind Hymettos, perhaps belonged to a priestly rigorous family. And he had the idea that he knew religious matters and the sacred laws more than anyone else in the world; so they proudly proclaimed that his prophecies had never come to pass.

In the Meno, Anytus had parted from Socrates with the significant words: 'That in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier to do men harm than to do them good;' and Socrates was anticipating another opportunity of talking with him. In the Euthyphro, Socrates is awaiting his trial for impiety. But before the trial begins, Plato would like to put the world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in that very matter touching which Socrates is accused. An incident which may perhaps really have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a learned Athenian diviner and soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the discussion.

This Euthyphro and Socrates are represented as meeting in the porch of the King Archon. (Compare Theaetetus) Both have legal business in hand. Socrates is defendant in a suit for impiety which Meletus has brought against him (it is remarked by the way that he is not a likely man himself to have brought a suit against another); and Euthyphro too is plaintiff in an action for murder, which he has brought against his own father. The latter has originated in the following manner:—A poor dependant of the family had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos. The guilty person was bound and thrown into a ditch by the command of Euthyphro's father, who sent to the interpreters of religion at Athens to ask what should be done with him. Before the messenger came back the criminal had died from hunger and exposure.

This is the origin of the charge of murder which Euthyphro brings against his father. Socrates is confident that before he could have undertaken the responsibility of such a prosecution, he must have been perfectly informed of the nature of piety and impiety; and as he is going to be tried for impiety himself, he thinks that he cannot do better than learn of Euthyphro (who will be admitted by everybody, including the judges, to be an unimpeachable authority) what piety is, and what is impiety. What then is piety?

Socrates, astonished at Euthyphro's confession that he had denounced his father as a murderer, immediately begins a conversation with this superstitious fanatic, and begs him, since he is indeed so wise in religious matters, to teach him what it really is the pious and the piety, in order to succeed with these lights of his teacher to be saved from the danger, which he is running against the accusation of Meletus, who he was equally accused of impious.

This is how the discussion begins, in which Euthyphro represents, according to the insightful critics, "those little pious people of antiquity, who by the word holy had a completely external and superficial meaning and in order to prove themselves pious and likable to the gods, they often do not yield even before actions, which were considered morally wasteful. Not Socrates. representative of the new religious ideas, argues on the contrary, that there can never be any difference between good and divine, considering that honesty or piety consists only in the perfect morality of man".

With this beautiful dramatic image, which even Sophocles would have envied, Plato raises the curtain on his graceful dialogue. Euthyphro the questioner conjectures that Socrates, accused of impiety by someone unknown to him called Meletus, of corrupting the youth with a new false teaching about the gods, came there, requested by the interrogation. Then Socrates too, subject to his innate ironic curiosity, from which he derives, as if from an empty source, all the assumptions of his philosophical and social discussions, guesses that Euthyphro is similarly there because of a serious judicial case, which Socrates hears with greater surprise.

Therefore, from his great piety and reverence for the divine laws, Euthyphro - he narrates to Socrates - who order the relentless pursuit of murderers, or rather those who succumb to a superstitious delusion about devotion, that is, about the purification of social miasmas, as is done knowing this in the course of the dialogue, they denounced this father of his as a murderer, so that both of them might be cleansed of the miasma. When he went on this path, he thought he was doing a pious act and was inwardly completely untroubled.

The dialogue proceeds after maximum brevity but with an abundant wealth of knowledge and arguments, which emerge one after the other unexpectedly like unprecedented flowers in a magical meadow, dazzling the reader with their brilliant radiance. Such is the power of logic and the skill of this chiefly debated elder of ancient Athens, that the arrogant soothsayer is forced many times to change his definition of piety.

Euthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very willing to undertake all the responsibility, replies: That piety is doing as I do, prosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge of murder; doing as the gods do—as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.

Socrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies that this dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with impiety. 'Are they really true?' 'Yes, they are;' and Euthyphro will gladly tell Socrates some more of them. But Socrates would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is piety?' 'Doing as I do, charging a father with murder,' may be a single instance of piety, but can hardly be regarded as a general definition.

Euthyphro replies, that 'Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety is what is not dear to them.' But may there not be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the gods? Especially, about good and evil, which have no fixed rule; and these are precisely the sort of differences which give rise to quarrels. And therefore what may be dear to one god may not be dear to another, and the same action may be both pious and impious; e.g. your chastisement of your father, Euthyphro, may be dear or pleasing to Zeus (who inflicted a similar chastisement on his own father), but not equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered at the hands of their sons).

Euthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either among gods or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer. Yes, rejoins Socrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but you are assuming the point at issue. If all the circumstances of the case are considered, are you able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all the gods are agreed in approving of our prosecution of him? And must you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? Waiving this last, however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and say that 'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.' To this Euthyphro agrees.

Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. He shows that in other cases the act precedes the state; e.g. the act of being carried, loved, etc. precedes the state of being carried, loved, etc., and therefore that which is dear to the gods is dear to the gods because it is first loved of them, not loved of them because it is dear to them. But the pious or holy is loved by the gods because it is pious or holy, which is equivalent to saying, that it is loved by them because it is dear to them. Here then appears to be a contradiction,—Euthyphro has been giving an attribute or accident of piety only, and not the essence. Euthyphro acknowledges himself that his explanations seem to walk away or go round in a circle, like the moving figures of Daedalus, the ancestor of Socrates, who has communicated his art to his descendants.

Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: 'Is all the pious just?' 'Yes.' 'Is all the just pious?' 'No.' 'Then what part of justice is piety?' Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which 'attends' to the gods, as there is another part of justice which 'attends' to men. But what is the meaning of 'attending' to the gods? The word 'attending,' when applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some way they are made better. But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service or ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman, the physician, and the builder have an end. To what end do we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? Euthyphro replies, that all these difficult questions cannot be resolved in a short time; and he would rather say simply that piety is knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is 'a science of asking and giving'—asking what we want and giving what they want; in short, a mode of doing business between gods and men. But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return? 'Nay, but we give them honour.' Then we give them not what is beneficial, but what is pleasing or dear to them; and this is the point which has been already disproved.

Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro, remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of piety, or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still hoping that he will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is prosecuted for impiety has disappeared. As in the Euthydemus the irony is carried on to the end.

The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of piety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the popular conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not offer any definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares the way for an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to his own character, refuses to answer himself.

Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the same person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose 'prancing steeds' Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away. He has the conceit and self-confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting his father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is incapable either of framing a general definition or of following the course of an argument. His wrong-headedness, one-sidedness, narrowness, positiveness, are characteristic of his priestly office. His failure to apprehend an argument may be compared to a similar defect which is observable in the rhapsode Ion. But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly to Socrates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest. Though unable to follow him he is very willing to be led by him, and eagerly catches at any suggestion which saves him from the trouble of thinking. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus, who, as he says, is availing himself of the popular dislike to innovations in religion in order to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly confident that he has weapons in his own armoury which would be more than a match for him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father, who has accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from blame. To purge away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty, whoever may be the criminal.

Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion which Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him. 'Piety is doing as I do' is the idea of religion which first occurs to him, and to many others who do not say what they think with equal frankness. For men are not easily persuaded that any other religion is better than their own; or that other nations, e.g. the Greeks in the time of Socrates, were equally serious in their religious beliefs and difficulties. The chief difference between us and them is, that they were slowly learning what we are in process of forgetting. Greek mythology hardly admitted of the distinction between accidental homicide and murder: that the pollution of blood was the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian diviner. He had not as yet learned the lesson, which philosophy was teaching, that Homer and Hesiod, if not banished from the state, or whipped out of the assembly, as Heracleitus more rudely proposed, at any rate were not to be appealed to as authorities in religion; and he is ready to defend his conduct by the examples of the gods. These are the very tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike of them, as he suspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety. Here is one answer to the question, 'Why Socrates was put to death,' suggested by the way. Another is conveyed in the words, 'The Athenians do not care about any man being thought wise until he begins to make other men wise; and then for some reason or other they are angry:' which may be said to be the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at Athens only. In the course of the argument Socrates remarks that the controversial nature of morals and religion arises out of the difficulty of verifying them. There is no measure or standard to which they can be referred.

The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act, corresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle (philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb (philoumenon and phileitai). The act is prior to the state (as in Aristotle the energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being loved is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is preceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtleties of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought and feeling. He means to say that the words 'loved of the gods' express an attribute only, and not the essence of piety.

Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.' Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation. He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the great poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated, and which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds the ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.' When further interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this 'attention to the gods,' he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and asking, and the like. Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these notions, (compare Symposium; Republic; Politicus) But when we expect him to go on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the spirit and the co-operation with them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and which every one must learn for himself.

There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little Dialogue:
(1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety;
(2) the antithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent only;
(3) the defence of Socrates.

The subtle connection with the Apology and the Crito; the holding back of the conclusion, as in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and other Dialogues; the deep insight into the religious world; the dramatic power and play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons for believing that the Euthyphro is a genuine Platonic writing. The spirit in which the popular representations of mythology are denounced recalls Republic II. The virtue of piety has been already mentioned as one of five in the Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four cardinal virtues of Republic IV. The figure of Daedalus has occurred in the Meno; that of Proteus in the Euthydemus and Io. The kingly science has already appeared in the Euthydemus, and will reappear in the Republic and Statesman. But neither from these nor any other indications of similarity or difference, and still less from arguments respecting the suitableness of this little work to aid Socrates at the time of his trial or the reverse, can any evidence of the date be obtained.

In this most lively dialogue, which according to the critics is more perfect than Crito in terms of general creative elaboration and philosophical precision, we are left with an exceptional impression by the mythological quarrels and battles of the gods and by Daedalus and his animated statues, with which he brilliantly compares the immovable language of Socrates, the moving and fluctuating definitions of Euthyphronus, and in favor of all this the proverbial Socratic irony, which pervades in an inductive and graceful way like the fragrant faleri breeze so thin that it is almost not felt by the one surrounded by sweat and toils during the discussion of Euthyphro. The meeting of these two extremely opposite persons, on the one hand the religious maniac soothsayer, going to morally repugnant acts out of supposed piety, and on the other the calm and peaceful expression of true piety in the character of Socrates, leaves us with the most dramatic impression, giving us vivid image of a perfect satirical work of antiquity, and at the same time makes the purpose of the dialogue fully clear, which was, according to tradition, to show how pious and just Socrates was, who had been sentenced to death on charges of impiety, because in this dialogue, as impious accused Socrates or as having a reprehensible idea about piety, as a humble critic expresses himself beautifully, "becomes a teacher of true piety and to those who are considered experts and enlightened in this regard".

Film adaptation :
Socrates (1971)

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Persons of the dialogue :

1. Euthyphro (Εὐθύφρων) : the Athenian prophet. His father owned land on the island of Naxos. His father's harsh treatment of a paid servant (Thetes under the Solonian Constitution) leads to Euthyphro raising charges against him. According to his own statements in this dialogue, his claims to prophecy and divination were considered a joke to other Athenians. He attempts to provide Socrates with a definition of piety but none are sufficient. It is entirely possible as well that Euthyphro was created by Plato as a literary device. His name in ancient Greek is ironically "straight thinker" or "Mr. Right-mind." A combination of εὐθύς (euthys), which means straight or direct and φρονέω (phroneô) which means to think or to reason. If Euthyphro and his father were historical people then this places the murder charges brought by Euthyphro and the main actions of this dialogue sometime between 405 BCE and 399 BCE, when the Athenian settlers were expelled from the Island of Naxos after the defeat at the Battle of Aegospotami.
2. Socrates (Σωκράτης) : the Athenian philosopher. He questions the nature of piety in this dialogue.

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Persons mentioned in Euthyphro dialogue :

1. Daedalus (Δαίδαλος) : a skillful architect and craftsman, seen as a symbol of wisdom, knowledge and power. He is the father of Icarus, the uncle of Perdix, and possibly also the father of Iapyx. Among his most famous creations are the wooden cow for Pasiphaë, the Labyrinth for King Minos of Crete which imprisoned the Minotaur, and wings that he and his son Icarus used to attempt to escape Crete.
2. Meletus (Μέλητος) : a citizen of Athens in the Classical Era, came from the Pithus deme and has become known for his prosecuting role in the trial - and eventual execution - of the philosopher Socrates in 399 BCE.
3. Stasinus (Στασῖνος) : a semi-legendary early Greek poet. He is best known for his lost work, Cypria which was one of the poems belonging to the Epic Cycle that narrated the War of Troy.
4. Tantalus (Τάνταλος) : a Greek mythological figure, most famous for his punishment in Tartarus: for trying to trick the gods into eating his son, he was made to stand in a pool of water beneath a fruit tree with low branches, with the fruit ever eluding his grasp, and the water always receding before he could take a drink.

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Dieties mentioned in Euthyphro dialogue :

1. Athene (Αθηνη) [or Athena, Pallas] : an ancient Greek goddess associated with wisdom, warfare, and handicraft who was later syncretized with the Roman goddess Minerva. Athena was regarded as the patron and protectress of various cities across Greece, particularly the city of Athens, from which she most likely received her name.
2. Cronos (Κρόνος) [or Cronus, Kronos] : the leader and youngest of the first generation of Titans, the divine descendants of the primordial Gaia (Mother Earth) and Uranus (Father Sky). He overthrew his father and ruled during the mythological Golden Age, until he was overthrown by his own son Zeus and imprisoned in Tartarus.
3. Hephaestus (Ἥφαιστος) : the Greek god of artisans, blacksmiths, carpenters, craftsmen, fire, metallurgy, metalworking, sculpture and volcanoes. In Greek mythology, Hephaestus was either the son of Zeus and Hera or he was Hera's parthenogenous child. He was cast off Mount Olympus by his mother Hera because of his lameness, the result of a congenital impairment; or in another account, by Zeus for protecting Hera from his advances (in which case his lameness would have been the result of his fall rather than the reason for it).
4. Here (Ἥρη) [or Hera] : the goddess of marriage, women, and family, and the protector of women during childbirth. In Greek mythology, she is queen of the twelve Olympians and Mount Olympus, sister and wife of Zeus, and daughter of the Titans Cronus and Rhea. One of her defining characteristics in myth is her jealous and vengeful nature in dealing with any who offended her, especially Zeus's numerous adulterous lovers and illegitimate offspring.
5. Proteus (Πρωτεύς) : an early prophetic sea god or god of rivers and oceanic bodies of water, one of several deities whom Homer calls the "Old Man of the Sea".
6. Uranus (Οὐρανός) [or Ouranos] : the personification of the sky and one of the Greek primordial deities. According to Hesiod, Uranus was the son and husband of Gaia (Earth), with whom he fathered the first generation of Titans.
7. Zeus (Ζεύς) : the sky and thunder god in ancient Greek religion and mythology, who rules as king of the gods on Mount Olympus.

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Places mentioned in Euthyphro dialogue :

1. Acropolis (Ἀκρόπολις) : the settlement of an upper part of an ancient Greek city, especially a citadel, and frequently a hill with precipitous sides, mainly chosen for purposes of defense. The term is typically used to refer to the Acropolis of Athens, yet every Greek city had an acropolis of its own. Acropolises were used as religious centers and places of worship, forts, and places in which the royal and high-status resided. Acropolises became the nuclei of large cities of classical ancient times, and served as important centers of a community.
2. Athens (Αθήνα) : one of the world's oldest cities, with its recorded history spanning over 3,400 years, and its earliest human presence beginning somewhere between the 11th and 7th millennia BC. According to Greek mythology the city was named after Athena, the ancient Greek goddess of wisdom, but modern scholars generally agree that goddess took her name after the city. Classical Athens was one of the most powerful city-states in ancient Greece. It was a centre for democracy, the arts, education and philosophy, and was highly influential throughout the European continent, particularly in Ancient Rome. For this reason, it is often regarded as the cradle of Western civilization and the birthplace of democracy in its own right independently from the rest of Greece.
3. Lyceum (Λύκειον) : a temple in Athens dedicated to Apollo Lyceus ("Apollo the wolf-god"). It was located outside and east of Athens's city wall. The Lyceum is famous for being a center of education, but it was used for numerous other activities including Athenian assembly gatherings, cult practices, and military exercises. Because the Lyceum had to serve many purposes, the building had to have specific structures developed to accommodate all the activities.
4. Naxos (Νάξος) : a Greek island and the largest of the Cyclades. It was the centre of the archaic Cycladic culture. The island is famous as a source of emery, a rock rich in corundum, which until modern times was one of the best abrasives available.
5. Pitthis (Πίθος) [or Pithus, Pithos] : a deme in ancient Attica of the phyle of Cecropis, sending three, four, or five delegates to the Athenian Boule. The name of the deme comes from Pittheus, the maternal grandfather of Theseus; so Theseus was originally a local hero.

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Terms mentioned in Euthyphro dialogue :

1. King Archon (ἄρχων βασιλεύς)    [or Archon basileus] : a Greek title, meaning "king magistrate": the term is derived from the words archon "magistrate" and basileus "king" or "sovereign". It was the last remnant of monarchy, although much of his powers, had been filtered away to other institutions such as the Areopagus and later the Boule and Ecclesia, he still nominally held a high position in Athenian society, alongside the archon eponymos and the polemarchos. The archon basileus was charged with overseeing the organisation of religious rites and with presiding over trials for homicide. The archon basileus was the high priest of the city-state.
2. Panathenaea (Παναθήναια) [or Panathenaic] : a games which held every four years in Athens in Ancient Greece from 566 BC to the 3rd century AD. These Games incorporated religious festival, ceremony (including prize-giving), athletic competitions, and cultural events hosted within a stadium. The festival was formed in order to honor the goddess Athena who had become the patron of Athens after having a competition with the god Poseidon where they were to win the favor of the Athenian people by offering the people gifts. The festival would also bring unity among the people of Athens.

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