Protagoras (Sophists And Virtue) By Plato Audiobook

Protagoras (Sophists And Virtue) By Plato audiobook with text and illustration, and dramatized 🎵 with sound effects and music, by Audiobooks Dimension.

Title : Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)
Author : Plato (Πλάτων)
Written : 393 BCE
Place of Origin : Ancient Greece
Original Media type : Papyrus, Manuscript
Original Language : Ancient Greek
Genre(s) : Ancient Greece, Dialogue, Philosophy
Translator : Benjamin Jowett (1817 - 1893)
Narrators : David Rintoul, and Full Cast
Musician : Nature's Eye
Editor : Audiobooks Dimension

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Dramatized  🎵

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Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας), a dialogue of Plato's, ironic but also profound, was written with the aim of indulging and enlightening by representing the morals and spirit of the sophists in this act and subjecting them to the scrutiny of strict criticism.

The premise of this dialogue, which actually resembles a drama and is faithful and lively if it were from nature, is as follows:

Apollodorus' young son Hippocrates rushes to Socrates' house and begs him to introduce him to the famous sage Protagoras, who, as he was informed, had arrived in Athens to teach people to become a sophist himself.

The Protagoras, like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put into the mouth of Socrates, who describes a conversation which had taken place between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias—'the man who had spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the world'—and in which the learned Hippias and the grammarian Prodicus had also shared, as well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a few words—in the presence of a distinguished company consisting of disciples of Protagoras and of leading Athenians belonging to the Socratic circle. The dialogue commences with a request on the part of Hippocrates that Socrates would introduce him to the celebrated teacher. He has come before the dawn had risen—so fervid is his zeal. Socrates moderates his excitement and advises him to find out 'what Protagoras will make of him,' before he becomes his pupil.

After a short discussion between Socrates and the young Hippocrates, the purpose of which was for the latter to form a clear idea of ​​what he is asking of Protagoras and exactly what Protagoras is teaching, after he tamed him, they went together to the house of Callias, where he hosted Protagoras. There they found not only Protagoras, but also other official sophists and various noble young students of theirs. After explaining the purpose of their visit to Protagoras, asks the question, 'What he will make of Hippocrates.' Protagoras answers, 'That he will make him a better and a wiser man.' 'But in what will he be better?'—Socrates desires to have a more precise answer. Protagoras replies, 'That he will teach him prudence in affairs private and public; in short, the science or knowledge of human life.'

This, as Socrates admits, is a noble profession; but he is or rather would have been doubtful, whether such knowledge can be taught, if Protagoras had not assured him of the fact, for two reasons:
    (1) Because the Athenian people, who recognize in their assemblies the distinction between the skilled and the unskilled in the arts, do not distinguish between the trained politician and the untrained;
    (2) Because the wisest and best Athenian citizens do not teach their sons political virtue. Will Protagoras answer these objections?

The sophists appear in the dialogue as ostentatious and imposing people both through their outward appearance and through their beautiful and technical speech. Protagoras in particular, in order to impose himself on Socrates and the others present, seriously and pompously informs that he teaches the art of managing private and public affairs, i.e. politics. Socrates questions whether politics can be taught. He claims that even the most uneducated citizens are invited to state assemblies and speak their mind in even more serious situations, without being taught the art of politics. And the most capable politicians, such as Pericles, were unable to pass on their political learning to their sons.

Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in which, after Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is represented as sending Hermes to them, bearing with him Justice and Reverence. These are not, like the arts, to be imparted to a few only, but all men are to be partakers of them. Therefore the Athenian people are right in distinguishing between the skilled and unskilled in the arts, and not between skilled and unskilled politicians.
    (1) For all men have the political virtues to a certain degree, and are obliged to say that they have them, whether they have them or not. A man would be thought a madman who professed an art which he did not know; but he would be equally thought a madman if he did not profess a virtue which he had not.
    (2) And that the political virtues can be taught and acquired, in the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by the fact that they punish evil-doers, with a view to prevention, of course—mere retribution is for beasts, and not for men.
    (3) Again, would parents who teach her sons lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of citizens? To the doubt of Socrates the best answer is the fact, that the education of youth in virtue begins almost as soon as they can speak, and is continued by the state when they pass out of the parental control.
    (4) Nor need we wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have foolish and worthless sons. Virtue, as we were saying, is not the private possession of any man, but is shared by all, only however to the extent of which each individual is by nature capable. And, as a matter of fact, even the worst of civilized mankind will appear virtuous and just, if we compare them with savages.
    (5) The error of Socrates lies in supposing that there are no teachers of virtue, whereas all men are teachers in a degree. Some, like Protagoras, are better than others, and with this result we ought to be satisfied.

Protagoras undertakes to prove that politics is taught as a subject effectively, in two ways, either by a fable or by evidential reasoning. He narrates the old myth of Epimetheus and his brother Prometheus, to whom the gods assigned to distribute to all living things on earth the various properties and advantages, the unpredictability of Epimetheus, the intelligence with which Prometheus stole fire from Hephaestus, and finally the intervention of Zeus, who freely gave to every man a share of the only two goods, which after the distribution remained, i.e. justice and respect. These two virtues are the basis of the political art and, since men received them, it was a natural thing and necessary that they should learn to give an opinion on political matters. So this knowledge is a gift from the gods. Nor can one imagine a man who does not have the slightest idea of ​​justice.

Protagoras proved that common people, who in the assemblies give their opinion, and often correctly, about political affairs, are not uneducated, but were taught justice and respect by the gods.

Then he refuted the other claim of Socrates, that is, the great politicians were not able to transmit their ability to their children, in the following way: always, he says, and in all places unjust people are criticized and punished. If the lack of justice was natural to man, it would be absurd to punish for a natural lack, just as it would be absurd to punish any man because he is sick or ugly. And they do not punish such people, because, however much they try, they cannot correct themselves. But they punish the wrongdoers, because they can, if they try, correct themselves and become righteous. So that all men admit, that every one may learn righteousness. For this reason the citizens, and they themselves and through teachers, try for the good of the state to inspire in their children the idea of ​​justice. And the fact that the children of virtuous people do not always become virtuous comes from the fact that all people do not come into the world equally gifted, and that, in order to acquire a higher virtue, one needs to have a better natural disposition and great efforts.

Socrates is highly delighted with the explanation of Protagoras. But he has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has spoken of the virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different names of the same thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like the parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one part is like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, is now taken up and cross-examined by Socrates:—
'Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness opposed to one another?'—'Then justice is unholy.' Protagoras would rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain point of view nearly the same. He does not, however, escape in this way from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission that everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed to wisdom; and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore temperance and wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already admitted to be nearly the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has now to be compared with justice.

Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process to which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled by the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just. He therefore defends himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say, he makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause of the audience.

Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on the part of Socrates that he cannot follow a long speech, and therefore he must beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to accommodate him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the two cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short?

Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and then by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias proposes an umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he would rather suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask and he will answer, and that when Protagoras is tired of asking he himself will ask and Protagoras shall answer. To this the latter yields a reluctant assent.

Protagoras selects as his thesis a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which he professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says,
     'Hard is it to become good,'
and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, 'Hard is it to be good.' How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem, is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman of Simonides, but apparently only with the intention of flattering him into absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (εΐναι) to be, and (γενέσθαι) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then the word difficult or hard is explained to mean 'evil' in the Cean dialect. To all this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims, Socrates slily withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that his assent was only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation of the whole passage. The explanation is as follows:—

The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which is not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is brevity, which was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven sages. Now Pittacus had a saying, 'Hard is it to be good:' and Simonides, who was jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was designed to controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not 'hard to be good,' but 'hard to become good.' Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly impressive manner that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon Pittacus. This, though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company, and meets with the special approval of Hippias, who has however a favourite interpretation of his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades to defer.

Socrates sees that the discussion up to this point was not scientific, but with examples from experience, and that it was not possible to reach a precise conclusion, he changes his method and gives a scientific course to the discussion.

The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of Socrates on the practice of introducing the poets, who ought not to be allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men's own thoughts should supply them with the materials for discussion. A few soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and Socrates. So he puts the question like this: in order to know whether virtue can be taught, it is necessary to find out what it consists of, and then the old question is repeated, 'Whether the virtues are one or many?'  So he asks Protagoras if virtue is a simple thing or composed of parts independent of one another, and if justice, temperance and valor are such parts of virtue. To which Protagoras is now disposed to reply, that four out of the five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that the fifth, courage, is unlike the rest. Socrates proceeds to undermine the last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from him the admission that all virtue is in the highest degree good:—

The courageous are the confident; and the confident are those who know their business or profession: those who have no such knowledge and are still confident are madmen. This is admitted. Then, says Socrates, courage is knowledge—an inference which Protagoras evades by drawing a futile distinction between the courageous and the confident in a fluent speech.

Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil? Protagoras seems to doubt the morality or propriety of assenting to this; he would rather say that 'some pleasures are good, some pains are evil,' which is also the opinion of the generality of mankind. What does he think of knowledge? Does he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is overcome by passion? or does he hold that knowledge is power? Protagoras agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power.

This, however, is not the doctrine of men in general, who maintain that many who know what is best, act contrary to their knowledge under the influence of pleasure. But this opposition of good and evil is really the opposition of a greater or lesser amount of pleasure. Pleasures are evils because they end in pain, and pains are goods because they end in pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil is the preference of the lesser pleasure to the greater. But then comes in the illusion of distance. Some art of mensuration is required in order to show us pleasures and pains in their true proportion. This art of mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved once more to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the origin of all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, or the greater pain to the less, except from ignorance. The argument is drawn out in an imaginary 'dialogue within a dialogue,' conducted by Socrates and Protagoras on the one part, and the rest of the world on the other. Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, admit the soundness of the conclusion.

Socrates then applies this new conclusion to the case of courage—the only virtue which still holds out against the assaults of the Socratic dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through ignorance. This explains why cowards refuse to go to war:—because they form a wrong estimate of good, and honour, and pleasure. And why are the courageous willing to go to war?—because they form a right estimate of pleasures and pains, of things terrible and not terrible. Courage then is knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance. And the five virtues, which were originally maintained to have five different natures, after having been easily reduced to two only, at last coalesce in one. The assent of Protagoras to this last position is extracted with great difficulty.

Socrates, through successive questions, makes Protagoras contradict himself and admit at last, unwillingly, that virtue is by nature one and simple, for if it were composed of parts unlike the one to the other, none of these parts would contain within itself anything of that which the other part contains; and then justice would exclude valor and temperance justice, and we would be able to conclude that the just the temperate righteous cannot be valiant. And besides, if the parts of virtue are opposites to one another, we might conclude that one thing can have many opposites, which is an impossible thing. Virtue, then, is one and simple both in its essence and in its action, and no one wanted to divide it into parts. And the so-called parts of virtue are various modes of it, not excluding each other, contained within its own essence and united with it, like the conclusions of a reasoning with the principle from which they derive. So the different parts of virtue, which are called virtues, are profoundly connected with one another, are interconnected and form a whole.

Considered in this way, virtue cannot be introduced into the soul gradually through progressive teaching, as Protagoras claimed, i.e. to be taught in order first justice through rules and examples, then bravery, etc., and be implanted in the soul. Virtue with all its ramifications is born from the inspiration of the nature of honor, because through the same effort it surrounds both its essence and its ways thanks to the innate feeling of good, which precedes and creates it. Therefore, this knowledge, which is really more ancient and higher than the knowledge of virtue, no one can teach it, because no one can receive it from another but only through himself, because we are born with it.

The irresistible reasonings of Socrates did not convince the arrogant sophist, who still advances sophistic arguments saying that valor is necessarily separate from the other virtues, because even the most unjust and the most profligate can be shown to be valiant. But Socrates proves that valor, when it lacks judgment, with other reasons of knowledge, is not true valor. The essence of valor is the knowledge of things which are awesome and those which are not. Since all the virtues are one and the same, and knowledge is the condition of this one and only, and knowledge can be taught, Socrates seems to have contradicted himself by now admitting the same opinion with Protagoras, that virtue is fruit of knowledge, because it can be taught.

Socrates concludes by professing his disinterested love of the truth, and remarks on the singular manner in which he and his adversary had changed sides. Protagoras began by asserting, and Socrates by denying, the teachableness of virtue, and now the latter ends by affirming that virtue is knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things, while Protagoras has been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and this is almost equivalent to saying that virtue cannot be taught. He is not satisfied with the result, and would like to renew the enquiry with the help of Protagoras in a different order, asking
(1) What virtue is, and
(2) Whether virtue can be taught. Protagoras declines this offer, but commends Socrates' earnestness and his style of discussion.

Either because Socrates wanted at the end of the contest to make it clear to Protagoras that he can prove what he wants better than a sophist, both for and against, or because he wanted to leave the question of whether virtue can be taught or not, interrupts the dialogue addressing compliments and laudatory speeches to Protagoras and postponing the continuation and end of the discussion to another time.

The Protagoras is often supposed to be full of difficulties. These are partly imaginary and partly real. The imaginary ones are
    (1) Chronological,—which were pointed out in ancient times by Athenaeus, and are noticed by Schleiermacher and others, and relate to the impossibility of all the persons in the Dialogue meeting at any one time, whether in the year 425 BCE, or in any other. But Plato, like all writers of fiction, aims only at the probable, and shows in many Dialogues (e.g. the Symposium and Republic, and already in the Laches) an extreme disregard of the historical accuracy which is sometimes demanded of him.
    (2) The exact place of the Protagoras among the Dialogues, and the date of composition, have also been much disputed. But there are no criteria which afford any real grounds for determining the date of composition; and the affinities of the Dialogues, when they are not indicated by Plato himself, must always to a great extent remain uncertain.
    (3) There is another class of difficulties, which may be ascribed to preconceived notions of commentators, who imagine that Protagoras the Sophist ought always to be in the wrong, and his adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or that passage—e.g. in the explanation of good as pleasure—Plato is inconsistent with himself; or that the Dialogue fails in unity, and has not a proper beginning, middle, and ending. They seem to forget that Plato is a dramatic writer who throws his thoughts into both sides of the argument, and certainly does not aim at any unity which is inconsistent with freedom, and with a natural or even wild manner of treating his subject; also that his mode of revealing the truth is by lights and shadows, and far-off and opposing points of view, and not by dogmatic statements or definite results.

The real difficulties arise out of the extreme subtlety of the work, which, as Socrates says of the poem of Simonides, is a most perfect piece of art. There are dramatic contrasts and interests, threads of philosophy broken and resumed, satirical reflections on mankind, veils thrown over truths which are lightly suggested, and all woven together in a single design, and moving towards one end.

In the introductory scene Plato raises the expectation that a 'great personage' is about to appear on the stage; perhaps with a further view of showing that he is destined to be overthrown by a greater still, who makes no pretensions. Before introducing Hippocrates to him, Socrates thinks proper to warn the youth against the dangers of 'influence,' of which the invidious nature is recognized by Protagoras himself. Hippocrates readily adopts the suggestion of Socrates that he shall learn of Protagoras only the accomplishments which befit an Athenian gentleman, and let alone his 'sophistry.' There is nothing however in the introduction which leads to the inference that Plato intended to blacken the character of the Sophists; he only makes a little merry at their expense.

The 'great personage' is somewhat ostentatious, but frank and honest. He is introduced on a stage which is worthy of him—at the house of the rich Callias, in which are congregated the noblest and wisest of the Athenians. He considers openness to be the best policy, and particularly mentions his own liberal mode of dealing with his pupils, as if in answer to the favourite accusation of the Sophists that they received pay. He is remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits throughout the discussion under the trying and often sophistical cross-examination of Socrates. Although once or twice ruffled, and reluctant to continue the discussion, he parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to be, as he says of himself, the 'least jealous of mankind.'

Nor is there anything in the sentiments of Protagoras which impairs this pleasing impression of the grave and weighty old man. His real defect is that he is inferior to Socrates in dialectics. The opposition between him and Socrates is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false, but of the old art of rhetoric and the new science of interrogation and argument; also of the irony of Socrates and the self-assertion of the Sophists. There is quite as much truth on the side of Protagoras as of Socrates; but the truth of Protagoras is based on common sense and common maxims of morality, while that of Socrates is paradoxical or transcendental, and though full of meaning and insight, hardly intelligible to the rest of mankind. Here as elsewhere is the usual contrast between the Sophists representing average public opinion and Socrates seeking for increased clearness and unity of ideas. But to a great extent Protagoras has the best of the argument and represents the better mind of man.

For example:
    (1) one of the noblest statements to be found in antiquity about the preventive nature of punishment is put into his mouth;
    (2) he is clearly right also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which Socrates himself, at the end of the Dialogue, is disposed to concede); and also
    (3) in his explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have bad sons;
    (4) he is right also in observing that the virtues are not like the arts, gifts or attainments of special individuals, but the common property of all: this, which in all ages has been the strength and weakness of ethics and politics, is deeply seated in human nature;
    (5) there is a sort of half-truth in the notion that all civilized men are teachers of virtue; and more than a half-truth
    (6) in ascribing to man, who in his outward conditions is more helpless than the other animals, the power of self-improvement;
    (7) the religious allegory should be noticed, in which the arts are said to be given by Prometheus (who stole them), whereas justice and reverence and the political virtues could only be imparted by Zeus;
    (8) in the latter part of the Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing that 'pleasure is the only good,' Protagoras deems it more in accordance with his character to maintain that 'some pleasures only are good;' and admits that 'he, above all other men, is bound to say "that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things."'

There is no reason to suppose that in all this Plato is depicting an imaginary Protagoras; he seems to be showing us the teaching of the Sophists under the milder aspect under which he once regarded them. Nor is there any reason to doubt that Socrates is equally an historical character, paradoxical, ironical, tiresome, but seeking for the unity of virtue and knowledge as for a precious treasure; willing to rest this even on a calculation of pleasure, and irresistible here, as everywhere in Plato, in his intellectual superiority.

The aim of Socrates, and of the Dialogue, is to show the unity of virtue. In the determination of this question the identity of virtue and knowledge is found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are one, then virtue can be taught; the end of the Dialogue returns to the beginning. Had Protagoras been allowed by Plato to make the Aristotelian distinction, and say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied with knowledge; or to point out with Aristotle that the same quality may have more than one opposite; or with Plato himself in the Phaedo to deny that good is a mere exchange of a greater pleasure for a less—the unity of virtue and the identity of virtue and knowledge would have required to be proved by other arguments.

The victory of Socrates over Protagoras is in every way complete when their minds are fairly brought together. Protagoras falls before him after two or three blows. Socrates partially gains his object in the first part of the Dialogue, and completely in the second. Nor does he appear at any disadvantage when subjected to 'the question' by Protagoras. He succeeds in making his two 'friends,' Prodicus and Hippias, ludicrous by the way; he also makes a long speech in defence of the poem of Simonides, after the manner of the Sophists, showing, as Alcibiades says, that he is only pretending to have a bad memory, and that he and not Protagoras is really a master in the two styles of speaking; and that he can undertake, not one side of the argument only, but both, when Protagoras begins to break down. Against the authority of the poets with whom Protagoras has ingeniously identified himself at the commencement of the Dialogue, Socrates sets up the proverbial philosophers and those masters of brevity the Lacedaemonians. The poets, the Laconizers, and Protagoras are satirized at the same time.

Not having the whole of this poem before us, it is impossible for us to answer certainly the question of Protagoras, how the two passages of Simonides are to be reconciled. We can only follow the indications given by Plato himself. But it seems likely that the reconcilement offered by Socrates is a caricature of the methods of interpretation which were practised by the Sophists—for the following reasons:
    (1) The transparent irony of the previous interpretations given by Socrates.
    (2) The ludicrous opening of the speech in which the Lacedaemonians are described as the true philosophers, and Laconic brevity as the true form of philosophy, evidently with an allusion to Protagoras' long speeches.
    (3) The manifest futility and absurdity of the explanation of (Greek), which is hardly consistent with the rational interpretation of the rest of the poem. The opposition of (Greek) and (Greek) seems also intended to express the rival doctrines of Socrates and Protagoras, and is a facetious commentary on their differences.
    (4) The general treatment in Plato both of the Poets and the Sophists, who are their interpreters, and whom he delights to identify with them.
    (5) The depreciating spirit in which Socrates speaks of the introduction of the poets as a substitute for original conversation, which is intended to contrast with Protagoras' exaltation of the study of them—this again is hardly consistent with the serious defence of Simonides.
    (6) the marked approval of Hippias, who is supposed at once to catch the familiar sound, just as in the previous conversation Prodicus is represented as ready to accept any distinctions of language however absurd. At the same time Hippias is desirous of substituting a new interpretation of his own; as if the words might really be made to mean anything, and were only to be regarded as affording a field for the ingenuity of the interpreter.

This curious passage is, therefore, to be regarded as Plato's satire on the tedious and hypercritical arts of interpretation which prevailed in his own day, and may be compared with his condemnation of the same arts when applied to mythology in the Phaedrus, and with his other parodies, e.g. with the two first speeches in the Phaedrus and with the Menexenus. Several lesser touches of satire may be observed, such as the claim of philosophy advanced for the Lacedaemonians, which is a parody of the claims advanced for the Poets by Protagoras; the mistake of the Laconizing set in supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation because they bruise their ears; the far-fetched notion, which is 'really too bad,' that Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, (έπαίνημι), because he is addressing a Lesbian. The whole may also be considered as a satire on those who spin pompous theories out of nothing. As in the arguments of the Euthydemus and of the Cratylus, the veil of irony is never withdrawn; and we are left in doubt at last how far in this interpretation of Simonides Socrates is 'fooling,' how far he is in earnest.

All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work like the Protagoras are not easily exhausted. The impressiveness of the scene should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of Socrates in the second part for Protagoras in the first. The characters to whom we are introduced at the beginning of the Dialogue all play a part more or less conspicuous towards the end. There is Alcibiades, who is compelled by the necessity of his nature to be a partisan, lending effectual aid to Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of impartiality; Callias, here as always inclining to the Sophists, but eager for any intellectual repast; Prodicus, who finds an opportunity for displaying his distinctions of language, which are valueless and pedantic, because they are not based on dialectic; Hippias, who has previously exhibited his superficial knowledge of natural philosophy, to which, as in both the Dialogues called by his name, he now adds the profession of an interpreter of the Poets. The two latter personages have been already damaged by the mock heroic description of them in the introduction. It may be remarked that Protagoras is consistently presented to us throughout as the teacher of moral and political virtue; there is no allusion to the theories of sensation which are attributed to him in the Theaetetus and elsewhere, or to his denial of the existence of the gods in a well-known fragment ascribed to him; he is the religious rather than the irreligious teacher in this Dialogue. Also it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much respect as is consistent with his own ironical character; he admits that the dialectic which has overthrown Protagoras has carried himself round to a conclusion opposed to his first thesis. The force of argument, therefore, and not Socrates or Protagoras, has won the day.

But is Socrates serious in maintaining
    (1) that virtue cannot be taught;
    (2) that the virtues are one;
    (3) that virtue is the knowledge of pleasures and pains present and future?

These propositions to us have an appearance of paradox—they are really moments or aspects of the truth by the help of which we pass from the old conventional morality to a higher conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught is a paradox of the same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but must be drawn out of him; and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses or citations from the poets. The second question, whether the virtues are one or many, though at first sight distinct, is really a part of the same subject; for if the virtues are to be taught, they must be reducible to a common principle; and this common principle is found to be knowledge. Here, as Aristotle remarks, Socrates and Plato outstep the truth—they make a part of virtue into the whole. Further, the nature of this knowledge, which is assumed to be a knowledge of pleasures and pains, appears to us too superficial and at variance with the spirit of Plato himself. Yet, in this, Plato is only following the historical Socrates as he is depicted to us in Xenophon's Memorabilia. Like Socrates, he finds on the surface of human life one common bond by which the virtues are united,—their tendency to produce happiness,—though such a principle is afterwards repudiated by him.

It remains to be considered in what relation the Protagoras stands to the other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one of the earlier or purely Socratic works—perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of them—is indicated by the absence of any allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence; and also by the different attitude assumed towards the teaching and persons of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The Charmides, Laches, Lysis, all touch on the question of the relation of knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded, if not as preliminary studies or sketches of the more important work, at any rate as closely connected with it. The Io and the lesser Hippias contain discussions of the Poets, which offer a parallel to the ironical criticism of Simonides, and are conceived in a similar spirit. The affinity of the Protagoras to the Meno is more doubtful. For there, although the same question is discussed, 'whether virtue can be taught,' and the relation of Meno to the Sophists is much the same as that of Hippocrates, the answer to the question is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas; the real Socrates is already passing into the Platonic one. At a later stage of the Platonic philosophy we shall find that both the paradox and the solution of it appear to have been retracted. The Phaedo, the Gorgias, and the Philebus offer further corrections of the teaching of the Protagoras; in all of them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the chief or only good, is distinctly renounced.

Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters of men and aspects of the truth, especially of the popular and philosophical aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the way, which, as Theodorus says in the Theaetetus, are quite as agreeable as the argument, we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. This is an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon as it was found; and yet has to be recovered by every one for himself who would pass the limits of proverbial and popular philosophy. The moral and intellectual are always dividing, yet they must be reunited, and in the highest conception of them are inseparable. The thesis of Socrates is not merely a hasty assumption, but may be also deemed an anticipation of some 'metaphysic of the future,' in which the divided elements of human nature are reconciled.

Why do the sophists and in particular Protagoras attract promising young men with such force? Part of the attraction, no doubt, is that Protagoras is suppose to be a powerful speaker, and they hope the sophist will turn them, too, into powerful speakers. In a democratic society that does not acknowledge any rights of the individual and in which most important decisions are made by the people, a large assembly, or a court with a large jury, on the basis of speeches, the ability to speak well is, no doubt, a crucial and perhaps vital asset for young men of ambition. But we need not underestimate the young men we encounter here by supposing they are just out to make a career in public life. Rather, they seem somehow aware that a traditional education is insufficient to deal with the problems a citizen of Athens faces in the second half of the fifth century. They sense that traditional ways are inadequate, that one must approach problems in a enlightened, rational way, and that there should be a special competence, and expert, in dealing with them. Indeed, according to the dialogue, Protagoras promises to impart just such an expertise. He is made to say that he will teach his students precisely what they come for, and he explains that he teachs how best to run one's household, sound deliberation in one's own affairs, but also in the affair of the city, and how one is best to act and speak concerning them. Often this is translated as "the art of politics", but, from the context, what Protagoras has in mind is perhaps rather the art of the citizen, the competence that makes a citizen a good citizen, part of which is to run one's household property.

Now, one can immediately see why such a claim, on the part of an influential and respected figure like Protagoras, would be regarded as a threat by the people, by democrats. Democracy rests on the assumption that the affairs of a city are not the subject of some special expertise, but that every citizen is competent to judge them. To claim that a special expertise or art is needed for these matters comes dangerously close to claiming that the people are not fit to rule, for they do not have this expertise. They may not have the talent to acquire it. They certainly do not have the time or the money to enroll with Protagoras. The fact that Protagoras attracts ambitious young men, from prominent families, whose attitude towards democracy is ambivalent, would heighten the misgivings. On the other hand, he does not attack democratic procedures, and seems unwilling to. On the contrary, he rhetorically supports the ideology on which these procedures rest. The result is a certain confusion in his own position: he supports the value of special expertise, but also the democratic ethos that is fundamentally at odds with it.

Film adaptation :
Socrates (1971)

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Persons of the dialogue :

1. Companion : some one familiar with Socrates, but no other information about him survives.
2. Socrates (Σωκράτης) [469 - 399 BCE] : an Athenian whose mature life was devoted to discussing ethical questions with any and all interested persons, in a charateristic way which has come to be considered as one of the central methods of philosophizing in western culture. Plato was greatly influenced by Socrates, and he used Socrates as a speaker in nearly all of his dialogue.

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Persons mentioned in Protagoras dialogue :

1. Achilles (Ἀχιλλεύς) : a hero of the Trojan War who was known as being the greatest of all the Greek warriors. A central character in Homer's Iliad, he was the son of the Nereid Thetis and Peleus, king of Phthia and famous Argonaut. Achilles was raised in Phthia along with his childhood companion Patroclus and received his education by the centaur Chiron.
2. Acumenus (Ἀκουμενός) : a physician of Athens who lived in the 5th century BCE. He was mentioned as the friend and companion of Socrates.
3. Adeimantuses, the two (Ἀδείμαντος) : one was a general in the Peloponnesian War; the other a face in the crowd.
4. Agathocles (Ἀγαθοκλῆς) : prominent musicians and music teachers.
5. Agathon (Ἀγάθων) : an Athenian boy, went on to achieve success a a tragedian.
6. Alcibiades (Ἀλκιβιάδης) [450 - 404 BCE] : Athenian, son of Cheinias, noted in his youth for his great beauty and intellectual promise; later notorious for his alleged acts of religious desecration and denounced for betrayal of his city when he fought for Sparta in the later stages of the Peloponesian War.
7. Andron (Ἄνδρων) : face in the crowd, son of Androtion.
8. Androtion (Ἀνδροτίων) : father of Andron.
9. Antimoerus of Mende : faces in the crowd.
10. Apollodorus (Ἀπολλόδωρος) : father of Hippocrates.
11. Ariphron (Ἀρίφρων) : brother of Pericles.
12. Bias of Priene (Βίας ὁ Πριηνεύς) : a Greek sage. He is widely accepted as one of the Seven Sages of Greece and was renowned for his probity.
13. Callaeschrus : father of Critias.
14. Callias (Καλλίας) [450 - 370 BEC] : a wealthy Athenian and patron of culture, often ridiculed for his extravagance.
15. Cepis : father of one of Adeimantuses.
16. Charmides (Χαρμίδης) [446 - 403 BCE] : an Athenian, brother of Plato’s mother, and a leader in the oligarchic revolution in 404 BCE. As a young man Charmides was renowned for his beauty.
17. Chilo (Χείλων) : a Spartan and one of the Seven Sages of Greece.
18. Cleinias (Κλεινίας) : a younger brother of the famous Athenian statesman Alcibiades, and a member of the wealthy and influential Alcmaeonidae family.
19. Cleobulus (Κλεόβουλος) : a Greek poet and a native of Lindos. He is one of the Seven Sages of Greece.
20. Creon : father of Scopas.
21. Crison of Himera : the Olympic champion in the stade run (200 metres) in 448, 444 and 440 BCE.
22. Critias (Κριτίας) [460 – 403 BCE] : Athenian and cousin to Plato’s mother. Critias was an accomplished intellectual and writer of prose and peotry. Like Charmides, he was a leader in the oligarchic tyranny of 404 BCE and was killed in the restoration of the democracy of 403 BCE. Critias has a major role in Plato’s Charmides dialogue.
23. Eryximachus (Ἐρυξίμαχος) : a doctor, friend of Phaedrus.
24. Eurybates (Εὐρυβάτης) and Phrynondas : historical individuals, whose names had in literature become synonymous with viciousness.
25. Glaucon (Γλαύκων) : father of Charmides.
26. Herodicus (Ἡρóδιĸος) : a physician, also a famous athletic trainer.
27. Hesiod (Ἡσίοδος) : a didactic poet active in the 8th century BCE. His two principle works, Theogony and Works and Days, were fundamental texts in Greek education and culture. Herodotus says that Homer and Hesiod gave the Greeks their gods.
28. Hippias of Elis (Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος) : a sophist noted for his knowledge in all areas of science and craft, ranging from mathematics and rhetoric to weaving and sewing. His dates are uncertain, younger than Protagoras and Socrates, perhaps older than Plato.
29. Hippocrates (Ἱπποκράτης) : younger friend of Socrates, and son of Apollodorus.
30. Hippocrates of Cos (Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Κῷος) [469 - 399 BCE] : an exact contemporary of Socrates, was renowned in his time and to his posterity as a powerful physician and healer. He was perhaps the first to theorize both about the causes of disease and the unique ethical responsibilities of the physician.
31. Hipponicus (Ἱππόνικος) : father of Callias, and an Athenian military commander. He was known as the "richest man in Greece"
32. Homer (Ὅμηρος) : epic poet active in the 8th century BCE, has been rightly called the educator of all Greece. He is cited frequently by Plato (five times in this dialogue).
33. Iccus (Ἴκκος) : a 6th century BCE athlete and trainer of athletes from southern Italy.
34. Leucolophides (Λευκολοφίδης) : father of one of Adeimantuses.
35. Musaeus (Μουσαῖος) : name associated with religious cults and practices at this period, he is considered to be wholly mythical.
36. Myson (Μύσων) : one of the Seven Sages of Greece.
37. Orpheus (Ὀρφεύς) : name associated with religious cults and practices at this period, perhaps historical, perhaps only mythical, was the faced singer whose beloved wife Eurydice died from the bite of a snake. Orpheus went to the underworld and pleaded with its ruler to allow her to live again. He was granted his plea on the condition that as he left Hades he would not turn around to look at her. He was unable to keep his promise and thence lost her forever, to his despair. Another tradition was that Orpheus was torn limb from limb by Thracian women (maenads) in a Dionysiac frenzy; yet despite this, he still lived, his severd ragged head floating down the river, singing forever sweetly.
38. Orthagoras : renowned for his excellent playing on the aulos (αὐλός), a reed instrument played like a recorder. Aulos is traditional translated as “flute” and is so translated later in this dialogue.
39. Paralus and Xanthippus (Πάραλος & Ξάνθιππος) : the two legitimate sons of Pericles, Xanthippus being the older one and Paralus the younger, and hence members of the Alcmaeonid family. Xanthippus was named after Pericles' father, while Paralus was named after the sacred trireme and flagship of the Athenian fleet.
40. Pausanias (Παυσανίας) : a lawyer, friend of Agathon.
41. Pericles (Περικλῆς) [495 – 429 BCE] : the greatest 5th century BCE Athenian statesman and general. He was esteemed not only for his military and civic accomplishments but also for his outstanding ability as an orator.
42. Phaedrus (Φαῖδρος) : a promising young intellectual, friend of Eryximachus.
43. Phason : brother of Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus.
44. Pheidias (Φειδίας) : an exact contemporary of Plato, was a sculptor; he was renowned for the statue of Athena in the Parthenon and of Zeus at Olympia.
45. Pherecrates (Φερεκράτης) : an Athenian writer of comic plays and prize-winner at the Leanion dramatic competition in the late 5th century BCE.
46. Philippides : faces in the crowd.
47. Philomelus : father of Philippides.
48. Pittacus (Πιττακός) [650 – 570 BCE] : ruler of Mytilene and often considered one of the Seven Sages.
49. Polycleitus (Πολύκλειτος) : a sculptor who flourished during the last half of the 5th century BCE, was renowned for his statue of Hera at Argos.
50. Prodicus of Ceos (Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος) : a sophist noted for his careful distinctions of meaning among terms. His dates are uncertain; according to Plato in the Apology, he was alive in 399 BCE. Plato allows Socrates to say that he admires Prodicus’s approach to inquiry; given Socrates’ own commitment to making careful distinctions as an element of proper philosophical method.
51. Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας) : one of the earliest and most successful sophists. His dates are uncertain; he probably died around 415 BCE at the age of 70.
52. Pythocleides : prominent musicians and music teacher.
53. Satyrus : a slave of Hippocrates that ran away to Oenoe.
54. Scopas (Σκόπας) : the Thassalian nobleman, head of the Scopadae clan, fond of drinking, convivial company and vain displays of wealth. He is one of the most colourful of Simonides' ignorant patrons.
55. Simonides (Σιμωνίδης) [556 – 468 BCE] : a lyric and elegiac poet best known now for his epitaph on the Spartan dead at Thermopylae.
56. Solon (Σόλων) : an archaic Athenian statesman, lawmaker, political philosopher, and poet. He is one of the Seven Sages of Greece and credited with laying the foundations for Athenian democracy.
57. Tantalus (Τάνταλος) : a Greek mythological figure, most famous for his punishment in Tartarus: for trying to trick the gods into eating his son, he was made to stand in a pool of water beneath a fruit tree with low branches, with the fruit ever eluding his grasp, and the water always receding before he could take a drink.
58. Thales (Θαλῆς) : an Ancient Greek pre-Socratic philosopher from Miletus in Ionia, Asia Minor. Thales was one of the Seven Sages, founding figures of Ancient Greece.
59. Zeuxippus (Ζεύξιππος) : a painter who flourished in the late 5th century BCE, was noted for his subtle use of color and for exceptional realism; his painting of grapes were said to have deceived birds.

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Deities mentioned in Protagoras dialogue :

1. Apollo (Απολλων) : a complex deity with multiple spheres of power; most relevant in this context were those of prophecy, wisdom, and law.
2. Athene (Αθηνη) : patron goddess of Athens. The special areas of her power refered to here were the arts of warfare and the more docile arts and crafts of weaving, spinning, smithing, and potting.
3. Hephaestus (Ἥφαιστος) : god of fire and also of the craft of smithing and technological invention, was especially honored in urban areas, where these crafts were most highly developed.
4. Hermes (Ἑρμῆς) : god of communication between realms—from gods to men, and the guide of souls of men to the netherworld; he was also associated with fertility and impudent clever pranks.
5. Prometheus (Προμηθεύς) and Epimetheus (Ἐπιμηθεύς) : sons of Iapetus the Titan and Clymene. Hesiod and Aeschylus (5th century BCE tragedian) are the primary sources for our knowledge of the legends of Prometheus; Protagoras here gives a rather different account to suit his own purposes. On the traditional accounts, Prometheus (whose name means “fore-thinker”) stole fire (which perhaps represents technological power generally) from Zeus in order to help human beings have an easier and better life. According to Hesiod, because of this act of Prometheus, Zeus punished all men by creating the lovely and tempting Pandora, whose allure causes life to be difficult for men. Epimetheus (whose name means “after-thinker”) was held to be simple-mined, lacking in cleverness, and unable to act wisely. It was he who was responsible for letting loose all the evils and sufferings of mankind by accepting Zeus’ gift of Pandora. According to Aeschylus, Prometheus himself was horribly punished by Zeus—he was tied to a rock, where an eagle perpetually pecked at and ate parts of his liver.
6. Scamander (Σκάμανδρος) : a river god in Greek mythology.
7. Simois (Σιμόεις) : a river god in Greek mythology.
8. Zeus (Ζεύς) : the sky and thunder god in ancient Greek religion and mythology, who rules as king of the gods on Mount Olympus.

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Places mentioned in Protagoras dialogue :

1. Abdera (Άβδηρα) : a major Greek polis on the Thracian coast.
2. Athens (Ἀθῆναι) : the capital and largest city of Greece. Athens is one of the world's oldest cities, with its recorded history spanning over 3,400 years, and its earliest human presence beginning somewhere between the 11th and 7th millennia BCE.
3. Ceos (Κέως) : a Greek island in the Aegean Sea, home of Simonides and of his nephew Bacchylides, both ancient Greek lyric poets, of the Sophist Prodicus, and of the physician Erasistratus.
4. Cerameis (Κεραμεῖς) : a deme of ancient Attica, located in the center of Athens, northeast of the Dipylon Gate, which extended both inside and outside the city walls. In its territory lay an important necropolis.
5. Cos (Κως) : a Greek island in the southeastern Aegean Sea. The name Cos is first attested in the Iliad, and has been in continuous use since.
6. Crete (Κρήτη) : the largest and most populous of the Greek islands. The island is mostly mountainous, and its character is defined by a high mountain range crossing from west to east.
7. Delphi (Δελφοί) : the site of the temple to Apollo where it was believed that the god would answer questions put to him through the Pythia (oracular priestess); this temple was also the location of the inscriptions constitutive of the Delphic ethical tradition—'Know thyself,' and 'Nothing too much.'
8. Elis (Ηλεία) : a historic region in the western part of the Peloponnese peninsula of Greece.
9. Hellas (Ἑλλάς) : a name for all lands inhabited by Hellenes, i.e. all of ancient Greece, including the Greek colonies.
10. Heraclea (Ἡράκλεια) : a small island between the islands of Naxos and Ios.
11. Himera (Ἱμέρα) : a large and important ancient Greek city situated on the north coast of Sicily at the mouth of the river of the same name.
12. Lacedaemon (Λακεδαίμων) : a prominent city-state in Laconia in ancient Greece, also known as Sparta.
13. Megara (Μέγαρα) : a town in West Attica, Greece. It lies in the northern section of the Isthmus of Corinth opposite the island of Salamis. Megara defected from the Spartan-dominated Peloponnesian League (c. 460 BCE) to the Delian league due to border disputes with its neighbour Corinth; this defection was one of the causes of the First Peloponnesian War (460 – c. 445 BCE). By the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace of 446–445 BCE Megara was forced to return to the Peloponnesian League.
14. Mende (Μένδη) : one of the cities that controlled trade routes along the coast of Thrace; there were even confirmed dealings with the Greek colonies in Italy, especially concerning the export of the famous local wine Mendaeos oinos.
15. Miletus (Μῑ́λητος) : a city on the western coast of Anatolia.
16. Mitylene (Μυτιλήνη) : the capital of the Greek island of Lesbos.
17. Oenoe (Οἰνόη) : a deme of Athens, situated upon the confines of Boeotia and Attica, near Eleutherae, and upon the regular road to Plataea and Thebes.
18. Priene (Πριήνη) : an ancient Greek city of Ionia (and member of the Ionian League) located at the base of an escarpment of Mycale.
19. Scamander river (Σκάμανδρος) : a river flows west from Mount Ida and empties into the Aegean Sea. According to the Iliad, the battles of the Trojan War were fought in the lower courses of Scamander.
20. Selymbria (Σηλυμβρία) : a town of ancient Thrace on the Propontis.
21. Simois river (Σιμόεις) : a small river of the ancient Troad, having its source in Mount Ida, which passed by Troy, joined the Scamander River below that city.
22. Tarentum : a coastal city among the most important poleis in Magna Graecia, becoming a cultural, economic and military power that gave birth to philosophers, strategists, writers and athletes such as Archytas, Aristoxenus, Livius Andronicus, Heracleides, Iccus, Cleinias, Leonidas, Lysis and Sosibius.

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Terms mentioned in Protagoras dialogue :

1. “I lifted up my eyes and saw […] : “ variants of this phrase are used repeatedly by Odysseus in his account of the heroes he saw during his visit to the underworld. This allusion to Homeric epic establishes a mock-heroic tone for the scene in Callias’s house.
2. “My eyes beheld Tantalus” : there is no obvious specific point to the implied comparison between Prodicus and Tantalus, who was punished in Hades by eternal thirst and hunger though food and water were tantalizingly close. Prodicus does seem to have been in bed with a cold.
3. Apologue (ἀπόλογος) : a brief fable or allegorical story with pointed or exaggerated details, meant to serve as a pleasant vehicle for a moral doctrine or to convey a useful lesson without stating it explicitly. Unlike a fable, the moral is more important than the narrative details. As with the parable, the apologue is a tool of rhetorical argument used to convince or persuade.
4. Argive (Ἀργεῖος) : resident of the city of Argos (Άργος).
5. Asclepiad (Ἀσκληπιάδης) : a title borne by many Ancient Greek medical doctors, notably Hippocrates of Cos. It is not clear whether the Asclepiads were originally a biological family, or simply a member of an order or guild of doctors.
6. Astronomy (αστρονομία) : a natural science that studies celestial objects and the phenomena that occur in the cosmos. It uses mathematics, physics, and chemistry in order to explain their origin and their overall evolution. Objects of interest include planets, moons, stars, nebulae, galaxies, meteoroids, asteroids, and comets. Relevant phenomena include supernova explosions, gamma ray bursts, quasars, blazars, pulsars, and cosmic microwave background radiation. More generally, astronomy studies everything that originates beyond Earth's atmosphere.
7. Athenian : a citizen or resident of ancient Athens. As an adjective, it refers to anything associated with Athens.
8. Cean : resident of Ceos (Κέως), a Greek island in the Aegean Sea.
9. Chenian : resident of Chen (Χήν), a town and polis (city-state) of Oetaea in ancient Thessaly. Its location is on Mount Oeta.
10. Cretans (Κρήσιος) : resident of Crete (Κρήτη), the largest and most populous of the Greek islands.
11. Elean : resident of Elis (Ἦλις), a district in southern Greece on the Peloponnese, bounded on the north by Achaea, east by Arcadia, south by Messenia, and west by the Ionian Sea.
12. Geometry (γεωμετρία) : a branch of mathematics concerned with properties of space such as the distance, shape, size, and relative position of figures.
13. Gods : a supernatural being considered to be sacred and worthy of worship due to having authority over the universe, nature or human life.
14. Greek language (Ἑλληνική) : the most widely spoken lingua franca in the Mediterranean world. It eventually became the official language of the Byzantine Empire and developed into Medieval Greek.
15. Heaven : a common religious cosmological or transcendent supernatural place where beings such as deities, angels, souls, saints, or venerated ancestors are said to originate, be enthroned, or reside. According to the beliefs of some religions, heavenly beings can descend to Earth or incarnate and earthly beings can ascend to Heaven in the afterlife or, in exceptional cases, enter Heaven without dying.
16. Hellenes (Έλληνες) : an ethnic group and nation native to Greece, Cyprus, southern Albania, Anatolia, parts of Italy and Egypt, and to a lesser extent, other countries surrounding the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea.
17. Lacedaemonians : resident of Lacedaemon (Λακεδαίμων) / Sparta, a prominent city-state in Laconia.
18. Lenaean festival / Lenaia (Λήναια) : an annual Athenian festival with a dramatic competition. It was one of the lesser festivals of Athens and Ionia in ancient Greece. The Lenaia took place in Athens in Gamelion, roughly corresponding to January. The festival was in honour of Dionysus Lenaios.
19. Lesbian (dialect) : the set of dialects of Ancient Greek spoken mainly in Boeotia; in Thessaly; in the Aegean island of Lesbos; and in the Greek colonies of Aeolis in Anatolia and adjoining islands.
20. Lindian : native resident of Lindos (Λίνδος), a fishing village on the island of Rhodes, in the Dodecanese, Greece.
21. Myrrhinusian : resident of Myrrhinus (Μυρρινοῦς), a deme of ancient Attica which belonged to the phyle (clan) of Pandionis. It lay to the east of Prasiae.
22. Politics (πολιτικά) : 'affairs of the cities', the set of activities that are associated with making decisions in groups, or other forms of power relations among individuals, such as the distribution of resources or status.
23. Prytanes (πρυτάνεις) : the executives of the boule of ancient Athens.
24. Seven Sages of Greece : wise men from 6th and 5th century BCE, respected for their practical wisdom.
25. Sophist (σοφιστής) : a teacher in ancient Greece in the 5th and 4th centuries BCE. Sophists specialized in one or more subject areas, such as philosophy, rhetoric, music, athletics and mathematics. They taught arete, "virtue" or "excellence", predominantly to young statesmen and nobility.
26. The Assembly (ἐκκλησία) : in Socrates’ time, open to all male citizens over 18. It was the ultimate authority in the state. Debate was open, and every member had the right to speak. Voting was by simple majority. Many cases required a quorum of 6,000 members.
27. Theban : resident of Thebes (Θῆβαι), a city in Boeotia, Central Greece.
28. Thessalian : resident of Thessaly (Θεσσαλία), one of the traditional regions of Ancient Greece.
29. Virtue (Virtus) : a trait of excellence, including traits that may be moral, social, or intellectual.

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